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Cable Television, New Technologies and the

First Amendment After Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C:
Erik Forde Uglana*
INTRODUCTION

From the moment it emerged as an independently viable communications
medium, the cable television industry has been forced ,to operate within the
shadow of regulatory oversight. Cable television systems, which now reach
into nearly two-thirds of all television households and serve almost sixty
million subscribers, l have nearly always been subjectto the regulatory whimsy
of government. Like many other communications industries-especiallyradio
and television broadcasting-cable television has become trapped in a stateimposed "cycle of repression,"2 unable to cut itself loose from government
control, despite its continual growth and sophistication. In fact, regulation of
this industry has never been more pervasive, nor intrusive, than it is today.
With passage of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992/ and judicial endorsement of much of that legislation in Turner
BroadcastingSystem,Inc. v. F.C.C.,4 cable's future rests squarely in the hands

* Erik Forde Ugland, 1995. All right reserved. An earlier version of this article
was presented at the Southeast Colloquium of the Association for Education in
Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Florida, March 10, 1995.
** B.A., MA., University of Minnesota; J.D., University of Minnesota Law
School. Research Associate for Media Law and Policy with the Freedom Forum
Media Studies Center at Columbia University. The views expressed in this paper are
those of Mr. Ugland alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Freedom Forum
Media Studies Center.
1. BROADCASTING & CABLE YEARBOOK, vol. 2, xi (1995).
2. Robert Com-Revere, New Technology and the FirstAmendment-Breakingthe
Cycle o/Repression, 17 HAsTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J.247, 264 (1994). See also
LUCAS A POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND TIm FIRsT AMENDMENT, Ch.
11 & 12 (U. of Cal. Press 1987).
3. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 106-385, § 2(a)(3), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460-1463 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559
(1988 & Supp. V 1993» [hereinafter '''92 Act"].
4. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) [hereinafter referred to as "Turner"] (Turner involves
a challenge by several cable system operators and programmers to §§ 4 and 5 of the
'92 Act, codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534 & 535 (Supp. V 1993), which require cable
television systems to carry the video signals of certain local broadcast stations. The
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of the federal government. Congress, with some help from the Supreme
Court, has made it clear that any blueprints for the future of the nation's
communications infrastructure will have to pass through Washington.
Turner is a landmark decision in this area, most importantly because it
ends nearly half a century of reticence by the Supreme Court regarding the
constitutional status of cable television. Is cable television like broadcasting,
which is subject to government regulation because of the scarcity of the
broadcast spectrum,s or is it more akin to the newspaper industry, which is
nearly immune from government encroachment?6 Even this most rudimentary
question has remained unanswered, which has helped produce a body of lower
court precedents that is unprincipled, inconsistent, and overly deferential.
Cable plaintiffs have registered a few victories in the lower COurtS,7 but the
majority of government regulations have survived constitutional attack. The
expansion of regulation has not been slowed by the Supreme Court, which, by
its inaction, has tacitly endorsed the government's regulatory scheme. In

Turner, the Court fmally ended its silence. Unfortunately for those in the
cable industry, however, the dominant effect of the decision was to sanction
the government's continued superintendence of the industry.
In addition to being a landmark cable television case, Turner is also an
important First Amendment case. The Court in Turner applied several of the
most common First Amendment principles and appeared to modify, or at least
clarify, some of those principles. In doing so, the Court also revealed
continuing divisions among its members over, for example, the precise
deftnition of what is a "content-based" regulation,s subject to strict judicial

plaintiffs argued that these "must-carry rules" interfere with their autonomy and
editorial discretion in selecting which stations and programs to carry on their systems
and therefore, the regulations violate their First Amendment free expression rights.)
5. See Red Lion Broadcasting, Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
6. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
7. See, e.g., Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1477
(N.D. Cal. 1986), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 1053 (1988) (prohibiting local franchise
authority from granting exclusive cable franchise); Home Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
567 F.2d 9, 45-46 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977) (rejecting
"spectrum scarcity"-the regulatory rationale for broadcasting-as applied to cable);
and Quincy Cable v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1169 (1'986) and Century Communications Corp. v. F.C.C., 835 F.2d 292, 293
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988) (both holding unconstitutional
different version of the FCC's must-carry rules).
8. Content-based regulations are those that restrict the expression of particular
subjects or viewpoints. These types of regulations violate the First Amendment unless
the government can show that they are necessary to serve a compelling govemmental
interest and that they are no more restrictive than necessary. Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980).
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scrutiny, versus a "content-neutral" regulation, subject to less exacting
scrutiny.9
While the Turner decision leaves much to be desired-especially for
cable system operators and programmers-the fact that the Court at least
sought to establish some First Amendment standards for this industry makes
the case noteworthy. This is just the beginning, however. The impact of the
Turner decision could be dramatic. As our nation leaps headlong into the
"Information Age," Turner could become an important precedent for all new
communications technologies as they struggle to retain their autonomy from
government regulators.
This article is divided into four parts. Part I explains the Turner decision
and its major holdings. Part I also traces the evolution of the cable television
industry and its changing regulatory framework. This may be background for
some readers, but it is essential to understanding the full significance of the
case. Part II looks at an important macro-level aspect of the decision-the
Court's search for a regulatory model for cable television. This part of the
paper examines the legitimacy of the Court's choice of models and analyzes
the possible effect that its choice will have on the cable industry and the
changing communications infrastructure. Parts III and IV focus more on the
micro-level consequences of the Court's decision. Part III contains an analysis
of the Court's application of constitutional law and how the decision may
substantially mo dify long-standing First Amendmentprinciples, while the final
section attempts to explain how Turner might be modified by the district court
on remand, and how the decision might affect another important cable
case-Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States10-that is currently making
its way through the federal courts.

I. TURNER AND ITS HISTORICAL AND JUDICIAL ANTECEDENTS
The United 'States Supreme Court's decision in Turner is historic if for
no other reason than because it is only the sixth case involving cable television

9. Content-neutral regulations are those that-unlike content-based
regulations-do not target particular subjects or viewpoints. Instead, the burden on
speech caused by these regulations is incidental to some other government objective.
Content-neutral regulations are typically subject to an intermediate-level scrutiny
whereby the government must show that: (1) the regulation furthers an important or

substantial government interest, (2) the burdens on speech caused by the regulation are
unrelated to the suppression of speech, and (3) the restriction on speech caused by the
regulation is no greater than necessary to advance the government's interest. United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), as modified by Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799-800 (1989).
10. 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993).
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that has reached the Court. 11 More importantly, it is the ftrst case that even
begins to answer some of the most basic paradigmatic questions about the
constitutional status of this medium. In the three decades that have passed
since the Federal Communications Commission [hereinafter FCC] ftrst began
regulating cable television, Turner is the fIrst case in which the Court grapples
with these fundamental issues. To be sure, however, the Court has just begun
this process, and indeed the Turner decision raised as many questions as it
- answered. But at least now there are some discemable boundaries to the
battlefteld.

A. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F. C. C.
On October 5, 1992, after years of intense lobbying and mounting public
dissatisfaction with cable rates and services, Congress overrode the veto of
President George Bush for the fIrst and only time and passed the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (lithe '92
Act").12 On its face, the '92 Act would appear to be a boon to those who
watch and pay for cable service. It promises improved customer service,13
ensured public access,14 and lower, government-controlled rates. IS
Unfortunately, the '92 Act, like most previous regulatory efforts, is riddled
with constitutionally suspect provisions.

11. The others are: U.S. v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968)
(challenge to FCC's regulatory authority over cable); U.S. v. Midwest Video Corp.
[.Midwest Video 1], 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (challenge by cable company to program
origination requirements); F.C.C. v. Midwest Video Corp. [.Midwest Video Il], 440
U.S. 689 (1979) (challenge to regulations requiring third-party access to cable
systems); Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986)
(challenge to city's refusal to grant more than one cable franchise in same market); and
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (challenge to special cable television sales
tax).
12. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460,47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-559 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993). The '92 Actwas enacted after three years of hearings regarding the structure
of the cable television industry. See S. REP. No. 92, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1991) (hearings), and the introduction to the act itself, §§ 2(a)(1)-(21) (conclusions).
13. 47 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (giving franchising authorities the
power to establish and monitor standards for customer service).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring that cable system
operators lease a certain portion of their channel capacity for use by programmers not
affiliated with the cable system).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 543 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing authority and criteria
for regulation of cable rates by the F.C.C. and local franchising authorities).

1995]

CABLE TELEVISION

803

Among the most pernicious of these are the so-called "must-carry"
rules,16 which were the subject of Turner. The must-carry rules require cable
system operators to set aside a certain portion of their channel capacity for
retransmission of local commercial and public broadcast signals. I7 While the
number of channels each cable system must reserve for local broadcasting
depends on the size of the system, cable system operators have no discretion
to determine which local broadcast signals must appear on their systems. IS
As soon as the must-carry rules went into effect, Turner Broadcasting
System,19 among other plaintiffs,20 fIled suit in federal district court
challenging enforcement of the rules. The plaintiffs argued that the mustcarry rules interfered with their editorial discretion to control the content of
their own systems, violating their First Amendment free expression rights.
Two other lawsuits were fIled2I challenging several other provisions of
the '92 Act, as well as some of the provisions from the Cable
Communications and Policy Act of 1984.22 Pursuant to a provision in the
'92 Act,23 a special three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia was required to hear the challenge to the must-carry
rules, while the claims challenging the other provisions of the act were
removed from the jurisdiction of the special panel24 and were heard by Judge
Thomas Penfield Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia. Essentially, then, there were two separate cases-Turner, which
involved the must-carry rules and was being heard by the special district court
panel, and Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. F.CC, which involved the challenges
to the non-must-carryprovisions and was being heard by Judge Jackson sitting

16. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

17. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
18. Unless, of course, a cable system operator decides to carry more local
broadcast signals than is required by the must-carry rules.
19. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993),
vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
20. Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993), and
National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993).
21. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. F.C.C., 810 F. Supp. 1302 (D.D.C. 1992),
and Discovery Communications, Inc. v. United States, 810 F. Supp. 1302 (D.D.C.
1992).
22. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2782, (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-613 (1988
& Supp. V 1993» [hereinafter '''84 ActIO].
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1988); 47 U.S.C. § 555(c)(l) (Supp. V 1993); see also '92
Act, supra note 3.
24. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 810 F. Supp. 1308, 1314 (D.D.C.
1992).
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alone.2S The three-judge district court panel in Turner granted, 2-1, the
government's motion for summary judgment.26 The plaintiffs appealed the
decision directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, which noted probable
jurisdiction.27
The plaintiffs in Turner made four basic arguments relating to the
constitutionality of the must-carry rules. First, they argued that the must-carry
rules are unconstitutional on their face and as applied, because they distinguish
between different types of speakers based on the content of their speech.28
Like all content-based regulations, therefore, the must-carry rules should be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny.29 Second, they argued, these regulations
should be strictly scrutinized because they impose special burdens on cable
system operators not required of other media?O Third, the cable plaintiffs
argued that the must-carry rules should be subject to strict scrutiny because
they favor one medium (broadcast) over another (cable)?1 Finally, the
plaintiffs argued that these regulations should be subject to strict scrutiny
because of the extent to which they intrude on the editorial functions of cable
system operators. Specifically, they force cable system operators to turn over
a portion of their channel capacity for use by others, which compels them to
promote speech they might disagree with or would otherwise decide not to
carry.32
The Supreme Court rejected each of these arguments and held, 5-4, that
the must-carry regulations are neutral on their face and as applied, because the
distinctions they make between speakers are not based on content, but on the
manner in which programmers transmit their messages. 33 The Court also
held that the differential treatment applied to the different media was not

25. Judge Jackson eventually ruled against most of the challenges to the nonmust-carry provisions. Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1993). This decision was appealed by several parties, including the federal
government. These appeals have been consolidated and are now before the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. This case is discussed in more detail in part
IV of this article.
26. Turner Broadcasting SysteID, Inc. v. F.C.C., 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993).
27. Turner Broadcasting SysteID, Inc. v. F.C.C., 114 S. Ct. 38 (1993).

28. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2458·64 (1994).
See also brief for appellant Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 1993 WI.. 638226.
29. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324-29 (1988).

30. Turner, 114 S. ct. at 2456-58. See also brief for appellant Time-Warner
Entertainment Co., 1993 WI.. 639374, *27-*31.
31. Turner, 114 S. ct. at 2456-58; See also brief for appellant Turner
Broadcasting SysteID, Inc., 1993 WI.. 638226, *23-*31.
32. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2464-69. See also brief for appellant Time Warner
Entertainment Co., 1993 WI.. 638232, *4-*6.
33. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2460-61.
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motivated by an interest in the content of particular messages, but by the fact
that the broadcasting industry was in economic peril and needed special
assistance. 34 Finally, the Court held that any special burdens imposed on the
cable industry were justified by the "special characteristics" of cable, namely,
its supposed ability to exercise "bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control" over
television programming.3S
The Supreme Court concluded that because the must-carry rules were
content-neutral, the regulations were not subject to strict scrutiny and should
instead be analyzed under the test articulated in United States v. 0 'Brien?6
The 0 'Brien test-as modified by Ward v. Rock Against Racism37-applies
to government actions that restrict speech but do not target speech. In other
words, the burden on speech posed by such regulations must be merely
"incidental" to some other government objective?8 To sustain these types of
regulations under 0 'Brien, the government must show: (1) that the regulation
furthers an important or substantial government interest, (2) that the
government interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech, and (3) that any
incidental restriction of speech is no more burdensome than necessary to
advance the government's interest?9
Having concluded that the must-carry rules are not aimed directly at
speech, the Court then analyzed the substantiality of the government's interest
in regulation. It recited the interests advanced by Congress in the introduction
to the '92 Act: "(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast

television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from
a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for
television programm;ng."40 Essentially, the Court concluded that the
restrictions imposed by the must-carry rules were incidental to the
government's substantial interest in preventing the demise of broadcast
television. 41 With respect to the third prong of the 0 'Brien test, however,

34. ld. at 2467.
35. ld. at 2466.
36. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
37. 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
38. For example, in a 'Brien, the plaintiff burned his draft card, which violated
federal law. The plaintiff argued that the law was unconstitutional because it restricted
his freedom to speak. The Court held, however, that the restriction of speech was not
one of the objectives of the law; rather, the burden on speech that the law produced
was incidental to the government's substantial interest in maintaining the integrity of
the draft system. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381-82.
39. ld. at 377.
40. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
41. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2461 (liThe design and operation of the challenged
provisions confirm that the purposes underlying the enactment of the must-carry
scheme are unrelated to the content of speech.").
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the Court remanded the case back to the district court panel to determine
whether the must-carry rules actually advance the government's asserted
interests and whether or not they are more restrictive than necessary to serve
those interests. 42
The fact that the Court remanded the case was an immediately small but
potentially significant victory for the cable plaintiffs. It is possible that on
remand, the district court will determine that the broadcast industry is not
really in economic peril and, therefore, the must-carry rules do not directly
advance the government's asserted interests. This seems unlikely, however,
given the tone of the district court's earlier decision in Turner and the
magnitude of Congress' investment in this legislation. Furthermore, even if
the plaintiffs win on remand,' it will be overshadowed by the Court's
damaging assessment of cable's status under the Constitution and in the
marketplace of ideas.
The validity of the arguments presented by both sides in Turner are
analyzed much more precisely in subsequent sections of this article. In
addition, the likely impact of the case is given substantial consideration,
including the possible modification of Turner on remand and the likely effect
of Turner on the Daniels case. At this point, however, it is important to try
to provide some context for this analysis.

B. The Origins and Evolution of Cable Television Regulation
The history of cable television regulation actually begins in 1934, 15
years before the first cable television system was operational. In that year,
Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934 ('34 Act),43 which, among
other things, established the FCC and gave it authority to regulate the services
and rates of broadcast licensees44 and common carriers.4S Obviously, the
'34 Act did not address the FCC's authority over the still unborn cable
industry. And despite the constant pleadings of disgruntled broadcasters, the
FCC consistently refused to assert jurisdiction over the cable industry during
the first decade of its existence. 46
Things began to change in the 1960s, however. In 1962, the FCC
refused to grant a license to a cable system operator unless it agreed to carry

42. ld. at 2470-72 (In September 1994, the parties were ordered by the district
court panel to submit cross-motions for summary judgment by March 1, 1995. The
district court is expected to hand down its decision in late 1995 or early 1996).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
44. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
46. See Frontier Broadcasting v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 253 (1958); and Report
and Order in Docket 12443,26 F.C.C. 403,431 (1959).
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local broadcast signals (must-carry rule) and to not import distant signals that

duplicated local programming (non-duplication rule).47 Then, in 1966, it
explicitly asserted jurisdiction over all cable systems. 48 Without any clear
statutory authority, and with scant acknowledgment of the rights of cable
system operators, the federal government had asserted substantial control over
the cable industry.
Cable system operators challenged these regulations in United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co./ 9 the frrst Supreme Court decision involving cable
television. The Court upheld both the FCC's rules and its assertion of
jurisdiction, but limited the FCC's authority to that which is "reasonably
ancillary" to the FCC's responsibilities for the regulation of broadcasting. 5o
Despite this apparent limitation., the FCC continued to expand its regulatory
control after Southwestern. In 1969, it ordered all cable operators to honor the
"fairness doctrine,"51 to provide equal time for political candidates, and to
create original programming.52 And in 1970, it barred all cross-ownership
of broadcast and cable systems located in the same market. 53
Again, cable system operators sought relief in the courts but without
success. In United States v. Midwest Video,s4 another U.S. Supreme Court
case, the plaintiff cable system operator challenged the program origination
rules. Once again the Court had an opportunity to defme the scope of the
FCC's authority and to articulate a regulatory model for cable television
regulation. Instead, it simply affirmed the FCC's jurisdiction over things
"reasonably ancillary" to broadcasting.55 The Court's approach to cable

47. See Carter Mountain Broadcasting Corp. v. F.C.C., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465
(1962), affd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir 1963), certdenied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). While
still dismissing any jurisdictional authority over cable television, the FCC's imposition
of these conditions indicated a growing sympathywith the interests of broadcasters and
a willingness to intervene, at least indirectly.
48. Second Report and Order in Dockets 14895, 15233 and 15971,2 F.C.C.2d

725, 729-44 (1966).
49. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
50. ld. at 178.
51. The "fairness doctrine" required that broadcasters (or in this case cable system
operators) air contrasting views on controversial issues. It was first applied to
broadcasters in 1949. Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.
1246, 1258 (1949). It was rescinded by the FCC in 1987 by Syracuse Peace Council,
2 F.C.C. 5042 (1987).
52. First Report and Order in Docket 18397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
53. Second Report and Order in Docket 18397, 19 RR2d 1775 (1970). This
order also prohibited the three major networks from owning cable systems anywhere.
54. Midwest Video l, 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
55. ld. at 668.
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regulation was, to this point, one of nonintervention. 56 One reason for this
was that the scope of the FCC's authority to regulate cable had been
considered solely a matter of statutory inte1pretation. The notion of a
constitutional limit on FCC jurisdiction had not been given serious
consideration. 57 In the absence of any prophylactic constitutional barrier, the
government had an open door to regulate, which it did. 58
Over the next several years the cable industry gradually managed to chip
away at the existing regulatory barriers. It received some help from the
FCC59 as well as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FC.C.,60 that court explicitly rejected "spectrum
scarcity" as a rationale for cable regulation. 61 It also rejected the suggestion
that cable systems are natural monopolies and should therefore be regulated
on that basis. 62 Not only did the court frnd the regulations in Home Box
Office to be beyond the statutory authority of the FCC under the '34 Act, but

56. Id at 673, 674 n.31. (citing General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. United
States, 449 F.2d 846, 863-864 (5th Cir. 1971» ("The Commission, thus, must be
afforded some leeway in developing policies and rules to fit the exigencies of the
burgeoning CATV industry. Where the on-rushing course of events [has] out paced
the regulatory process, the Commission should be enabled to remedy the [problem] .
. . by retroactive adjustments .... ").
57. In some earlier cases, the idea that cable regulations infringed on speech was
raised but dismissed with little elaboration. See, e.g., Black Hills Video Corp. v.
F.C.C., 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968); Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. F.C.C., 387 F.2d
220, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Idaho Microwave, Inc. v. F.C.C., 352 F.2d 729, 733 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); and Carter Mountain Broadcasting Corp. v. F.C.C., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465
(1962), 321 F.2d 359,364 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
58. In 1971, another set of comprehensive regulations was imposed on the cable
industry. Among other things, these rules: 1) allowed signal importation by cable
operators, but placed severe restrictions on the number and types of signals that could
be imported; 2) prohibited importation of programs that local stations had purchased
the rights to (non-duplication); 3) required cable operators to provide free access
channels for use by public, educational and government programmers (pEG channels);
and 4) promulgated a number of technical standards for the industry. These
requirements were later incorporated into the FCC's Cable Television Rules, issued in
February 1972. Cable Television Report and Order in Dockets 18397, 18397(a), 18373,
18416, 18892 and 18894, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
59. For example, the FCC rescinded the program origination rules. Report and
Order in Docket 19988, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974).
60. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
61. Id at 45. The "spectrum scarcity" or "scarce resource" rationale discussed in
detail infra notes 100-104 is the traditional justification for government regulation of
broadcasting. This rationale posits that because broadcast spectrum space is a finite
resource, the government is obligated to ensure its proper use.
62. Id at 46.
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it also held that the regulations were unconstitutional. 63 In Home Box Office,
for the first time, a federal appellate court had upheld the First Amendment
rights of cable operators and had begun to establish unique standards for the
industry. 64
Two years later in F.c.c. v. Midwest Video COrp.,65 the Supreme Court
had a chance to pick up where the D.C. Circuit left off in Home Box Office.
In Midwest Video II, a cable system operator challenged the constitutionality
of the FCC's mandatory public access channel requirements of 1972 and 1975.
The Court held that the rules exceeded the FCC's authority66 but did not
comment on the constitutionality of the access rules or of cable regulation
generally, except to note that those issues were "not frivolous.,,67 Cable's
constitutional status remained uncertain.
By the mid-1980s all the pieces were in place for sweeping deregulation
of the cable television industry-a Republican president, a relatively compliant
Congress, and a laissez-faire capitalist at the helm of the FCC. 68 These
players combined to produce the Cable Communications and Policy Act of
1984 ('84 Act).69 For years leading up to passage of the '84 Act, regulatory
authority over cable had been split between federal (FCC), state, and
municipal governments. 70 However, 'none of these bodies had explicit
congressional authority to regulate. The primary objective of the '84 Act,
then, was to establish a coherent regulatory framework in which the
jurisdictions of these different governments were more clearly defined.71

63. ld. at 49.

64. ld. at 46. The court recognized that cable system operators exercise many of
the same editorial functions as newspaper editors, and, therefore, many of the
traditional standards applicable to regulation of the print media might apply to cable.
It did not adopt the "print model," discussed infra notes 127-147, but it went a long
way toward distinguishing cable from broadcasting.
65. Midwest Video II, 440 u.s. 689 (1979).
66. The Court applied its test from Southwestern, fmding that the FCC's rules
were "reasonably ancillary" to its effective regulation of broadcasting. Id. at 708.
67. ld. at 710 n.19.
68. Mark Fowler, who argued for reliance on market forces rather thanregulation,
was the head of the FCC. See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace
Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 207, 209 (1982).
69. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-613 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
70. State and local governments have regulated cable services by requiring cable
system operators to obtain a franchise in order to l!ccess public rights of way such as
streets and telephone poles. Because installation of cable systems requires the use of
public rights of way, state and municipal governments can condition receipt of a
franchise on an applicant's first submitting to certain regulations.
71. 47 U.S.C. §521 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Consistent with the "New Federalism" of the Reagan era, the '84 Act
ceded much of the regulatory authority over cable to state and local
governments. Prospective cable system operators using public rights of way
are required under the '84 Act to receive a franchise grant from the local
franchising authorities.72
These authorities can grant "one or more"
franchise. 73 As it turns out, however, many only granted one franchise,
giving a state-sanctioned monopoly to the sole provider.74 In addition, under
the '84 Act, a franchiser may require provision of channel capacity for public,
educational, and governmental ("PEG") access,75 and franchisers must require
that franchisees make lock boxes available to their customers to block out
certain channels76 and provide leased access channels for commercial use by
programmers unaffiliated with the cable system operator.77
In the wake of the '84 Act, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia handed down two important cases-QuincyCable v. F.C.C. 78 and
Century Communications Corp. v. F.C.C. 79-each of which struck down a
different version of the FCC's must-carry rules as violative of the First
Amendment. Rejecting the scarcity rationale yet again, the court in Quincy
held that a different First Amendment standard must be applied to cable. so
The court applied the test from United States v. 0 'Brien81 for content-neutral
government restrictions of speech, and on that basis struck down the mustcarry provisions.82 The court added that a more exacting First Amendment
standard might be warranted, but because the must-carry rules failed the
intermediate standard of 0 'Brien, it was not necessary for the court to go any
further in its analysis. 83 In Century Communications, decided two years
later, the same court reviewed the constitutionality of a scaled-down version

72. 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). A franchising authority is the
state or local regulatory body that determines which cable system operators will
receive local franchises to provide cable services.
73. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
74. JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, AND TIm FIRsT
AMENDMENT 259 (1993).
75. 47 U.S.C. § 531(a) & (b) (1988).
76. 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(A) (1988).
77. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Systems with channel capacity of
36 to 54 must set aside 10 percent of their channels for leased access, and systems
with 54 or more channels must set aside 15 percent.
78. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
79. 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
80. Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1450.
81. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See supra notes 36-39.
82. Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1454-1462.
83. ld. at 1454.
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of the must-carry rules. Once again the court held the rules were not narrowly
tailored to serve a substantial government interest and were therefore invalid
under 0 'Brien. 84
The U.S. Supreme Court had another chance to advance a definitive First
Amendment model for cable in Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications,
Inc.,8s in which it addressed the constitutionality of exclusive franchise
grants. But once again the Court refused, despite the urgings of three
justices.86 Significantly, however, the Court acknowledged that cable system
'operators are "speakers" for First Amendment purposes and that application
of a broadcasting model to cable might not be appropriate. 87 No new
model was advanced, however, and cable's vulnerability to regulation
persisted.
The primary flaw of the '84 Act was that it deregulated the cable industry
while at the same time giving state and local governments the power to grant
exclusive franchises. Under the '84 Act, many exclusive franchisees
discovered that there was little to prevent them from increasing rates. 88
Eventually, consumer complaints reached a critical mass, inspiring Congress
to pass the '92 Act, the primary objective of which was to simultaneously
promote competition and protect consumers.89
The '92 Act affirms the jurisdiction of state and local franchising
authorities to regulate cable rates, although cable systems subject to "effective
competition," as defined in the Act,90 are exempt from rate regulation. 91 It

84. Century Communications, 835 F.2d at 304.
85. 476 U.S. 488 (1986) (In this case the plaintiff cable franchise applicant

brought suit alleging a violation of its First Amendment rights after being denied a
local cable franchise, even though there was "sufficient excess physical capacity" to
accommodate more than one franchise).
86. ld. at 496497 (Blackmun, J., Marshall, J., and O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. ld. at 494495.
88. Cable rates increased nearly 30 percent from 1986 to 1988, and in 1991, cable
rates were increasing by 14 percent annually, nearly twice the rate of inflation. S.
REP. No. 92, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1991). It is important to note, however, that
rates have not gone up uniformly and in addition, the type and volume of services has
increased. A cable system today offers much more than cable systems did just a few
years ago, and the number of channels on systems increases every year.
,89. ld. at 1.
90. See 47 U.S.C. §543 (1)(1) (Supp. V 1993) (stating that "effective competition
means that(A) fewer than 30 percent of the households in the franchise area subscribe
to the cable service of the cable system;
(B) the franchise area is(i) served by at least two unaffiliated multichannel video
programming distributors each ofwhich offers comparable video
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is important to note that none of the other regulations contained in the '92
Act-including the must-carry rules-are triggered by the presence or absence
of competition.
,Thus, the must-carry rules apply to all cable
systems-including those subject to same-market competition--even though
the absence of competition is the key regulatory rationale for the '92 Act.
Aside from rate regulation, the '92 Act also contains several provisions
designed to foster competition in the cable industry.92
Two of the most constitutionally suspect portions of the '92 Act are those
dealing with mandatory leased access93 and mandatory carriage of local
broadcast signals (the must-carry rules).94 Indeed, the District of Columbia
Circuit struck down two previous versions of the must-carry rules in Quincy
Cable and Century Communications. 9S The latest round of must-carry
rules-challenged in Tumer-give local broadcasters a choice between either
mandatory carriage of their signals by the cable system operator or payment
by the cable system operator to the broadcaster for the right to retransmit their
signals.96 What is so troublesome about the must-carry and leased access
provisions is that, like the public, educational, and government ("PEG") access

programming to at least 50 percent of the households in the
franchise area; and
(li) the number of households subscribing to programming
services offered by multichannel video program distributors other
than the largest multichannel video program distributor exceeds
15 percent of the households in the franchise area; or
(C) a multichannel video program distributor operated by the franchising
authority for that franchise area offers video programming to at least 50
percent of the households in that franchise area.").
91. However, "effective competition" is defmed so narrowly in the Act that only
one percent of all cable systems are exempt from rate regulation. Wesley R. Heppler,
The 1992 Cable Act: Rate Regulation, Must Carry, and Retransmission Consent,
CABLE TELEvISION LAW 1994: BEYOND TIm CABLE ACT 278 (practicing Law
Institute 1994).
92. Under the new law, franchising authorities are prohibited from granting
exclusive franchises and from unreasonably refusing to award an additional franchise.
47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(I) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In addition, franchise authorities are
permitted to refuse to grant franchises to cable system operators who already operate
a franchise in the same area. ld. Finally, municipalities are permitted to own cable

television systems and those that do are exempt from any rate regulation. Id.
47 U.S.C. § 532 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The leased access provisions
cable system operators to set aside a certain portion of their channel capacity
by unaffiliated commercial programmers.
47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35 (Supp. V 1993).
95. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
96. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35 (Supp. V 1993); 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (1988 & Supp. V
1993).

93.
require
for use
94.
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provisions in the '84 Act, they permit direct government interference with the
editorial functions of cable system operators, which the Supreme Court has
acknowledged are protected First Amendment activities.97 All three of these
regulations-must-carry, leased access, and PEG access-are now being
challenged in the courts. While the must-carry rules are challenged in Turner,
the constitutionality of the other two provisions is the subject of the Daniels
case. 98

ll. TuRNER AND THE SEARCH FOR A REGULATORY MODEL
Leading up to Turner, the world of cable television regulation was replete

with uncertainty. The lower courts were forced to hear challenges to cable
regulations with little guidance from the Supreme Court. The result of this
was a disjointed body of lower court precedents.99 Lower courts not only
produced different outcomes in similar cases, but the constitutional models
they applied (in those cases where they recognized the existence of
constitutional issues) were markedly divergent.
Some courts struck down certain regulations, holding that because cable
systems do not have to compete for spectrum space-the traditional
justification for regulation of the broadcast mediaIOO_they should be free
from most regulation. IOI Others, however, held that the cable media should
be regulated similarly to the broadcast media because, while they may not
compete for spectrum space, they do compete for access to public rights of
way.l02 Still other courts have upheld regulations based on the alleged

97. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991); Los Angeles v. Preferred
Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986).
98. Daniels Cablevision v. F.C.C., 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993). See discussion
infra text accompanying notes 216-19.
99. Compare Century Federal Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1472
(N.C. Cal. 1986) (prohibiting local franchise authority from granting exclusive cable
franchises) with Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCl Cablevision, Inc, 800 F.2d
711,712 (8th Cir 1986) (permitting exclusive franchise grants as a means offostering
competition).
100. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
101. See, e.g., Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465,
1471 (N.D. Cal. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1053 (1988) (liThe characteristic in
broadcasting that justifies increased governmental intrusion in that medium is absent
in [the cable context]").
.
102. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Products v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119,

127-28 (7th Cir. 1982) (equating cable with broadcasting because while the latter may
be regulated because of its use of the public airwaves, the fonner can be regulated
because of its use of other public rights-of-way, such as telephone poles and
underground ducts).
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natural monopoly status of cable103 or on more amorphous notions of
listeners'rights and the public good. 104
In order to resolve these inconsistencies, the Court, as it had
acknowledged years earlier,105 needed to adopt a single model for regulation
of cable television. In doing so, it had several prototypes from which to
choose-the broadcast model,106 the print model,l07 the common carrier
model,108 the public function model/ 09 the public forum model,110 and

103. See, e.g., Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580,
600 (W.D. Pa. 1987) ("Cable television's physical intrusion into the public rights of
way and the ease with which operators are able to create a natural monopoly in a local
market have provided justification for governmental regulation").
104. See, e.g., Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976,
987 (D.R!. 1983) ("It has been noted that if cable is to become a constructive force
in our national life, it must be open to all Americans. There must be relatively easy
access-for those who wish to promote their ideas, state their views, or sell their goods
or services").
105. See Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496
(1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("In assessing First Amendment claims concerning
cable access, the Court must detennme whether the characteristics of cable television
make is sufficiently analogous to another medium to warrant application of an already
existing standard or whether those characteristics require a new analysis").
106. See infra notes 115-126 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 127-147 and accompanying text.
108. The common carrier or public utility model is based on the notion that the
owner of the communications medium in question is not really a "speaker" but is more
of a conduit (carrier) for the speech of others. The owners of such systems merely
amplify the speech of others. Telephone systems are regulated primarily under a
common carrier model. In Turner, the Supreme Court explicitly reaffmned its prior
holdings in both Preferred and Leathers, that cable system operators do exercise
editorial functions that merit First Amendment protection. See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at
2456 and, supranote 97, and accompanying text. By acknowledging that cable system
operators are legitimate First Amendment speakers, the Court indirectly rejected the
applicability of a common carrier regulatory model.
109. Proponents of this approach seek, in no uncertain terms, the socialization of
infonnation. They are primarily "marketplace" critics who argue that in modem
society access to the infonnation marketplace is not possible for most Americans and
that the preservation of democracy requires access for groups whose ideas are
unrepresented. Access theorists contend that the mass media, though privately owned,
serve a crucial public function and therefore should be subject to rigid governmental
oversight. See generally Jerome Barron, Access to the Press-ANew FirstAmendment
Right, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641 (1967). Even assuming all of the access theorists'
factual presumptions are correct, this approach is glaringly unconstitutional. Not only
would it authorize content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions, both of which are
subject to strict scrutiny, it would permit the government to make these decisions.
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others. In Turner, the Court finally took a stand and adopted what could be
called the IIbottleneckll (or monopoly) model of regulation. Under this
approach, government authority to regulate is justified by the absence of
competition and the supposed ability of cable systems to work as IIbottlenecks ll
to diverse sources of video program m jng. 111 The government argued in
Turner, and the Court agreed, that because most television households now
subscribe to cable, the only practical way for broadcasters to reach viewers is
via a cable system. ll2 Cable system operators, therefore, have a competitive
1l3
advantage over broadcasters.
Furthermore, they have both the ability and
1l4

the financial incentive to exploit this advantage.
Why did the Court choose this model? Why was a distinct model for
cable necessary? What is it about the cable medium that distinguishes it from
the others, and are these differences relevant for First Amendment purposes?
This section attempts to answer these questions. It also seeks to make clear

This kind of government control over the dissemination of information and ideas is at
the apex of the First Amendment's prohibitions. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
48-49 (1976). The Court in Turner did not adopt this as a regulatory model, but it was
sympathetic to the notion that there is dysfunction in the marketplace that requires
government action. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2454-2455.
110. Proponents of the public forum rationale argue that by granting cable system
operators franchises to use public property, cable systems are in fact public forums, or,
alternatively, that because they use public rights of way, they should be subject to
regulation. First, cable systems are not public forums, as that phrase is used in
constitutional law; rather, cable systems merely use public forums. Second, although
cable systems use public rights of way, this alone should not subject them to anything
but the most structural regulation.
This model serves as the basis for most existing state and local regulation of
cable franchises. That is, the grant of a franchise, and access to public rights of way,
is conditioned on the franchisee first submitting to regulation. However, while the
government has the right to control the use of public property, this does not sanction
content-based regulations. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing, 486 U.S.
750 (1988). The public forum model in its purest form was not considered by the
Court in Turner. Nevertheless, the Court's analysis does seem to treat cable systems
as quasi-public in the sense that it permits the government to'force cable systems to
provide access to others.
111. See infra note 148-150 and accompanying text.
112. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2466.
113. Id. at 2454.

114. ld. at 2454 (referring to the fmdings of Congress, the Court notes, "The
power derives from the cable operator's ability, as owner of the transmission facility,
to 'terminate the retransmission of the broadcast signal, refuse to carry new signals,
or reposition a broadcast signal to a disadvantageous position.' The incentive derives
from the economic reality that [c]able television systems and broadcast television
stations increasingly compete for television advertising revenues.")
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that setting aside the more precise holdings of the Turner case, its greatest and
most troublesome legacy could be its adoption of the bottleneck model for
cable television and, similarly, its rejection of the print model.

A. Turner's Three Models
In Turner, the Court explicitly rejected one regulatory model
(scarcitylbroadcast), embraced another (bottleneck/monopoly), and indirectly
shunned the model it should have adopted, or at least taken more seriously
(print).

1. The ScarcitylBroadcast Model
The scarcity of broadcast spectrum space has been the fundamental
justification for federal broadcast regulation since Congress passed the Radio
Act of 1927. This regulatory rationale is based on the premise that because
spectrum space is limited, the government has to intervene and direct the
traffic. If it did not, "the [airwaves] would be of little use because of the
cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and
predictably heard. "lIS In 1962 when the FCC asserted jurisdiction over
cable, it assumed that because it had authority to regulate broadcasting, it had
implicit authority to regulate cable. This view was upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Southwestern. 116 What the FCC and the Court did not
understand, however, was that the cable industry was not "ancillari' to
broadcasting; it was a technically distinct industry with none of broadcasting's
scarcity problems. Nevertheless, even if cable could have been characterized
as ancillary to broadcasting in 1962, or even in 1968, this justification has
grown less tenable as the cable industry has expanded its use of non-broadcast
programming.1l7 By continuing to regulate cable television now that it is
an independently viable industry, the government has expanded the scope of

115. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969).
116. U.S. v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
117. Indeed, today it is more accurate to say that broadcasting is ancillary to cable
than vice versa. Congress acknowledges this by its insistence that broadcasters are in
need of special assistance from cable system operators. See 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4)
(Supp. V 1993), stating that the cable industry is becoming increasingly concentrated,
47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(l3) (Supp. V 1993), stating that there has been a shift in the video
programming industry from broadcasting to cable, and 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(I8) (Supp.
V. 1993), stating that cable systems have an economic incentive to "delete, reposition
or not carry local broadcast signals," which "seriously jeopardiz[es]" the continuing
viability of free broadcast television.
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its regulatory authority without a corresponding expansion or clarification of
its regulatory rationale. us
Modem proponents of the scarcity rationale argue that while cable is no
longer ancillary to broadcasting, and while there is no spectrum scarcity in the
cable industry, there is physical scarcity. That is, because there are a finite
number of cable lines that public rights of way can accommodate, government
should be allowed to regulate the industry.u9 But this view simply
overstates the extent of the physical limitations. While there is obviously
some conceivable limit to the number of cable lines a city can accommodate,
that number is certainly more than one, or two, or even three. And if three
or more cable systems were operational in anyone market, one would have
to say there is effective competition. Indeed, the notion of three, or even two,
competing daily newspapers in the same market is now almost fanciful, yet the
newspaper industry is justifiably beyond the reach of most regulation. 120
Also, any fear that, left unregulated, public rights of way would be clogged
with hundreds of cable lines is misplaced. Market forces will ensure the
survival of, at most, a handful of cable systems. So, even these more
contemporary incarnations of the scarcity rationale are insufficient to support
regulation of cable.
The Court's opinion in Turner apparently put the fmal nail in the scarcity
model's coffm. The legitimacy of this model as applied to cable had already
been rejected by lower COurts,121 but the Supreme Court had never addressed
the issue. In Turner, however, the Court was clear: "The rationale for
applying a less rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast
regulation, whatever its validity in the cases elaborating it, does not apply in
the context of cable regulation. ,,122
The practical consequence of the Court's rejection of "the scarcity
rationale is that virtually all regulations aimed at the cable industry will now
warrant at least some level of heightened First Amendment scrutiny. Unlike

in the broadcasting context, where government regulations are given
substantial judicial deference,l23 in the cable context, the government will

118. Although clearly Congress did attempt to defend its continued regulation of
cable through its passage of the '92 Act.
119. See discussion of the public forum model, supra note 110.
120. Except for truly content-neutral, generally applicable regulations, such as
those dealing with taxation or the environment. See Arkansas Writers' Project v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
121. Home Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,434
U.S. 829 (1977); Quincy Cable v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
122. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456.
123. The federal government has substantial authority to regulate the broadcasting
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now need to demonstrate that the regulation serves at least a substantial
government interest.
So, for most regulations targeting cable, the
o 'BrienIWard test will apply.124 It is likely, however, that rational basis
scrutiny will still be applied to purely structural laws, such as generally
applicable tax and environmental statutes. l2S It is also clear from the
Court's analysis that a regulation that clearly targets particular content or
viewpoints will be subject to strict scrutiny as in any other context. 126
However, as the analysis in Section III explains, the Court's defmition of what
is content-based has grown precariously narrow.

2. The Print Mode1127
The print model begins with the presumption that regulations that
interfere with either the content or the autonomy of the press are
unconstitutional, or at least subject to heightened scrutiny.128 Proponents of
regulation have rejected application of the print model to cable, emphasizing
the characteristic differences between the two industries. Clearly, some
differences exist, but the ones frequently cited to distinguish the two industries
are either factually inaccurate,l29 or are of no constitutional significance. 130

industry. The '34 Act authorizes the federal government to regulate the airwaves for
the public "interest, convenience and necessity." See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) and the Supreme Court's holding in Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395
U.S. 367, 380 (1969) ("This mandate to the FCC to assure broadcasters operate in the
public interest is a broad one"). While regulation of the broadcast industry technically
receives something more than rational basis First Amendment scrutiny, most
regulations are upheld. Because Congress has already spelled out the interests that
justify its supervision of the broadcasting industry, and because the Supreme Court has
already upheld the constitutionality of that system, individual regulations are, in effect,
presumptively constitutional.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
125. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) and Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
126. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458-59.
127. Also called the newspaper model.
128. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
129. For example, proponents of cable regulation insist that such regulation is
necessary because cable systems are natural monopolies. But this is not accurate,
especially in light of the recent entry of direct broadcast satellite systems into this
market, as well as telephone company provision of video dialtone service. See infra
notes 140 and 144. Nevertheless, even if cable systems are indeed natural monopolies,
they are no more so than newspapers. There is no reason, therefore, that these
industries should be treated differently for First Amendment purposes. See also

Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 247-256 (holding that monopoly status alone is an insufficient
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The print model of regulation is best capsulized in the Supreme Court's
opinion in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. 131 In that case, the
Court struck down a Florida statute that required newspapers that assail the
personal or professional character of a political candidate to give that
candidate an opportunity to reply in the paper free of charge. The Court
struck down the law as a violation of the First Amendment, and in doing so
it rejected many of the arguments relied upon by proponents of the must-carry
rules. For instance, the Court rejected Tornillo's claim that Florida's right-ofreply statute was constitutional because it fostered speech rather than restricted
it. The Court held that telling a paper what to print is no different than telling
it what not to print, and therefore the statute was unconstitutional even though
the government intended to increase speech. 132 The Tornillo court also
rejected monopoly-based arguments for regulation, holding that monopoly
status alone is an insufficient justification for "compelling editors and
publishers to publish that which 'reason' tells them should not be published
. . . ."133 Finally, any notion that newspapers could be made to serve as
public forums was rejected by this same reasoning. Forced public access
imposes a penalty based on the content of a newspaper, the Court held, by
forcing the paper to either eliminate stories to make room for those of the
"public," or to spend more money to provide additional space for those
stories. 134 Such a regulation is an unconstitutional "intrusion into the
functions of editors.,,13s This is precisely what the must-carry rules, as well
as the leased access and public access rules, require cable system operators to
do. These regulations would clearly be unconstitutional under a print model
approach, where there is a strong presumption of autonomy.
In Turner, the Court rejected the applicability of the print model to cable,
although its reasons were neither persuasive nor unanimous. First, the Court
drew attention to the evidence collected by Congress in enacting the '92 Act.

justification for government interference).
130. For instance, the fact that cable systems need to use public rights of way is
not a sufficient justification for imposition of a franchising process that allows
authorities to directly regulate the services of its franchisees. Newspapers, through
placement of newsracks, for example, use public rights of way as well. The same
standard that applies to newspaper access to public rights of way is easily and logically
transferable to cable. See Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750,
772 (1988) (holding that licensing schemes for newspaper access to public rights of
way must be content- and viewpoint-neutral, and must not give too much discretion
to individual administrators).
131. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
132. ld. at 256.
133. ld.
134. ld. at 256-58.
135. ld. at 258.
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It held that economic power in the cable industry is becoming increasingly
concentrated and that regulation is necessary to correct this "competitive
imbalance. 11136 But again, levels of competition in the cable television
industry are no more severe than those in the newspaper indUStry.137 And
even if some corrective regulation is necessary, the Court does not explain
why the problem could not be addressed by passage of laws that are truly
structural in nature and that do not intrude on the autonomy and editorial
functions of cable system operators. 138
Second, while it is true that ownership of the traditional mass media is
generally concentrating in fewer hands,139 the number and types of media
outlets continue to expand. This is especially true with respect to the new
video communications technologies. Among the current competitors are direct
broadcast satellite systems,140 which just recently began operating in dozens
of markets across the country;141 satellite master antenna systems
(SMATV);142 multichannel multipoint distribution service (MMDS);143 and
most importantly, telephone company (telco) provision of video
programming.144 In short, competition levels are increasing in this industry,

136. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2454.
137. See infra text accompanying note 152.
138. In fact, the '92 Act contains a number of provisions aimed at increasing
competition. Why was it not sufficient for Congress to pass these structural
provisions? The Court in Turner does not address this issue, although it is possible
that it will resurface on remand when the district court addresses the question of
whether the must-carry rules burden more speech than necessary.
139. See generally BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (4th ed., Beacon
Press 1992).
140. DBS systems allow studios to transmit signals directly to viewers. The
studio sends its signals to a satellite that is able to re-transmit the signal to a large area
of the country. Viewers within the satellite's "footprint" then can retrieve the signal
through a receiving dish, which costs about $700. The customer also pays a monthly
service fee for a package of video channels.
141. Noel Holston, Hot Dish for '90s and Beyond: Cable-Competing Satellite's
Picture, Sound Are Superior, MINNEAPOLis STAR TRmUNE, August 4, 1994 at lB.
142. SMATV systems are cable systems that are generally used to serve large
apartment complexes, hotels, etc. SMATV systems are comprised of a satellite receive
station located on the premises, which sends signals to the individual rooms or
apartments through coaxial cable.
143. This system is identical to SMATV except that the signal is sent from ilie
receive station to ilie individual viewer via microwave radio links railier fuan coaxial
cable.
144. Until recently, there were two regulatory obstacles that prevented telcos from
entering ilie video services marketplace. One of them has been rescinded and ilie oilier
is dying a slow but inevitable death. The fIrst of these is the lIinfonnation services"
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not the other way around. And with every increase in the level of
competition, the rationales for rejecting the print model of regulation are
further eroded. Not all of these rationales are premised on an absence of
competition, but each is undercut by the existence of competition.
In addition to the lack of competition argument, the Court in Turner
recites the contention of Congress that cable systems have the ability and the
incentive to harm broadcasters. 14s Congress and the Court presume that all
video programming must come to the viewer via cable, and if a local
broadcast station does not get its signal on that cable system, it will not
survive. This line of reasoning is also flawed for some, ftrst because it is
obviously not true that all video programming must come through cable.
Local broadcast signals can be received via traditional satellite dishes as well
as new direct broadcast satellite systems, via telephone lines, and, where these
options are not actually or practically available, most viewers can always
receive broadcast signals via an antenna. In fact, cable customers can
purchase an inexpensive switch that allows them to turn back and forth from
cable programming to over-the-air broadcast programming by simply flipping

ban that was part of the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ) that broke up AT&T into a
constellation of smaller, regional bell operating companies (RBOCs), i.e., the "baby
bells." United States v. American Telephone & Telephone, 552 F. Supp. 131, 189-90
(D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The
MFJ prohibited any of the RBOCsfrom providing information services because it was
believed that they could use their capital resources from their phone business to crosssubsidize their video enterprises, which would give them an unfair competitive
advantage over existing cable systems. Judge Harold Green of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia rescinded the information services ban. United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 328 and 332 (D.D.C. 1991), affd, 993 F.2d
1572 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Consumer Federation of America v. United States, 114
S. Ct. 487 (1993). In 1992, the FCC specifically authorized all telcos to provide video
dialtone services to their customers. In re Telephone Company-Cable Television
Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-63.58, Second Report and Order,
Recommendation to Congress and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7
F.C.C.R. 5781,5783 (1992).
The second major obstacle to telco entry into the cable business is the cable/telco
cross-ownership ban contained in the '84 Cable Act. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). This is an explicit prohibition of telco provision of video services.
However, several federal courts have recently found this provision to violate the First
Amendment rights of telcos, and the proposed telecommunications bill would repeal
this provision entirely. See infra text accompanying note 214.

145. Turner, 114 S. ct. at 2454.
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a switch. 146 In short, the barrier or bottleneck that Congress decries is
simply illusory.
Simply put, the rationales proffered by Congress and the Court in Turner
for rejecting the applicability of the print model are fatally flawed.
Unfortunately, the Court was unwilling to give proper scrutiny to the factual
presumptions upon which these regulations are founded. It is possible that on
remand the district court will return to some of these questions. But whether
it does or not, any hope of the print model being applied to the cable industry
was dashed by the Court in Turner. Just as troubling is that even if the
district court strikes down the must-carry rules on remand, the Supreme
Court's Turner opinion could take on a life of its own and survive as
precedent, even after its factual foundations are subsequently exposed. 147

3. The BottleneckIMonopoly Model
One of the most common arguments in favor of cable regulation is that
because of the lack of competition in the cable industry (economic scarcity),
the government has a responsibility to ensure that existing cable systems
adequately serve the public. Economic scarcity is the driving principle of the
'92 Act148 and was endorsed to some extent by the Court in Turner. 149
Unfortunately, this rationale is flawed in severalrespects. First, it is based on
an unduly narrow definition of competition. Under this theory, competition
levels are assessed within the cable industry, rather than in the information and
entertainment industry as a whole. In other words, monopoly theorists
erroneously presume that the information provided via cable is unavailable

146. The appellees in Turner pointed out that less than one percent of cable
households have a switching device (called an "AlB switch"). See brief for appellee
National Association of Broadcasters, 1993 WL 638229, *8-*9. But as the District of
Columbia Circuit has recognized in the past, surveys on the use of AlB switches are
"unpersuasive, for [they] almost certainly reflect merely the present consumer
unfamiliarity with the switch and antenna mechanism," and "to the extent it does not,
it may also reflect consumer disinterest in having access to off-the-air signals.1I
Century Communications Corp. v. F.C.C., 835 F.2d 292, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Another explanation for this is that most cable systems carry the popular broadcast
stations already, so consumers often have no need for an AlB switch (or, indeed, for
the must-carry rules). Congress seems to concede as much in the '92 Act itself. See
47 U.S.C. § 521 (a) (17) and (19) (Supp. V 1993).
147. See infra notes 205-215 for more discussion about how the Supreme Court's
Turner decision could be modified on remand.
148. See 47 U.S.C. § 521(a) (Supp. V 1993) (stating purposes of the Act); 47
U.S.C. § 548 (Supp. V 1993) (containing a variety of other measures designed to
foster competition in the video programming industry).
149. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2454.
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through other means. To the contrary, as media scholar Jonathan Emord
explains:
"[In 1987] 'the average media market ... had access to 36 cable channels,
... 10 over-the-air television stations, 20.4 AM and 19.5 FMradio signals,
15.9 newspapers, 11.8 magazines each with subscription rate figures of at
least 5 percent, and a VCR penetration rate of 48.7 percent.' From the
largest to the smallest markets, there is simply no single predominant
voice."lso

As Emord makes clear, the average media consumer has a plethora of
additional information and entertainment sources available to her. Also, these
figures do not even take into account the recent increases in competition levels
provided by direct broadcast satellite and video dialtone systems. 151
Nevertheless, the monopoly rationale is flawed in yet another way: It
supposes that the existence of only one cable system in a given market is a
condition that necessarily justifies government intervention. But daily
newspapers enjoy a similar absence of same-medium competition, and they are
not subject to government regulation. While it may be preferable to have
competing cable systems (or daily newspapers) in every city, our constitutional
history clearly rejects any attempt to achieve "effective competition" through
government fiat. 152 Even if the absence of same-medium competition
justifies application of some form of structural regulation (i.e., antitrust laws),
it certainly does not sanction interference with the editorial functions of cable
system operators.
Another flaw with this rationale is its presumption that the existence of
only one cable system in most cities is the result of the high cost of entry into

150. EMORD, supranote 74, at 287 (citing, P. VESTAL, AN ANALYSIS OF MEDIA
OUTLETS BY MARKET, App. II (1987), which was prepared for the Research and
Planning Department, National Association of Broadcasters).
151. See definitions, supra notes 140 and 144. Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS)
services are currently being provided by DirecTV and Primestar, and several other
similar video-via-satellite services. YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at xi. As of January
1995, 39 phone companies, representing about nine million customers, had filed
applications to provide video dialtone service. KATHLEEN M.H. WALLMAN, CABLE
TELEVISION LAW 1995, at 389 (p.L.!., 1995).
152. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977) (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S.
241,247-256 (1974)) (holding that "scarcity which is the result solely of economic
conditions is apparently insufficient to justify even limited government intrusion into
the First Amendment rights of the press [and] there is nothing in the record before us
to suggest a constitutional distinction between cable television and newspapers on this
point").
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153
the cable market.
In fact, while these market entry costs are certainly
substantial, many existing cable systems are free of same-medium competition
solely because the local franchising authority has granted them an exclusive
cable franchise prohibiting entry of competing systems. I54 In addition to the
. competitive bariiers imposed by many franchising authorities, there is
corresponding evidence that in many of those cities where there are no
exclusive franchises, there are competing cable systems. ISS Indeed, Emord
cites one report indicating that more cities have competing cable systems than
have competing daily newspapers.I56 In addition, even if one concedes that
the high cost of entry into the market repels competition, this is not unique to
the cable industry. The newspaper industry faces the same situation, with
established newspapers facing little direct competition. I57 The monopoly
rationale, therefore, is an insufficient justification for treating the cable
industry any differently than the properly unregulated newspaper industry.
Finally, it is important to note that the '92 Act contains a number of
provisions aimed at increasing competition in the cable industry, including the
prohibition of all exclusive franchise grants. I5S But at the same time
Congress seeks to foster competition through regulation, it justifies its other

153. Congress made reference to this in the "purposes" section of the '92 Act.
47 U.S.C. § 521(a) (Supp. V 1993). The Court in Turner also relies, in part, on this
notion in reaching its conclusion. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2454.
154. GEORGE H. SHAPlRO, PHILIP B. KURLAND AND JAMES P. MERCURIO,
CABLESPEECH 11 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1983). States and municipalities
often grant exclusive franchises because it limits the number of systems using its
public rights of way, and, most importantly, it allows the franchising authority to
attach conditions to its award of the exclusive franchise. Franchising authorities often
require as a condition of their grant of an exclusive franchise that the cable system
operator: "install their systems city-wide, include a greater number of channels than
needed, to construct special institutional networks and expensive studios to serve
perceived public purposes, and to pay franchise fees that exceed the government's cost
for permitting cable's use of public rights of way.... " These conditions are also

often attached to regular franchises, not just to exclusive franchises, which further
limits competition.
155. EMoRD, supra note 74, at 288.
156. EMaRD, supra note 74, at 288 (citing Thomas W. Hazlett, Duopolistic
Competition in Cable Television: Implications/or Public Policy, 7 YALE J. ON REG.
65, 67 (1990)).
157. One author noted a couple of years ago that only 24 cities in the United
States had competing daily newspapers, and in half of those cities, the two papers were
commonly owned as part of a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA), which allows two
papers to merge their physical and business operations while maintaining separate
editorial offices. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 139, at 124.
158. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

1995]

CABLE TELEVISION

825

regulations on the absence of competition. 159 Congress is attempting to
eliminate the conditions that are the very foundation of its claimed authority.
Does this mean Congress will rescind its authority, and the '92 Act itself, if
and when the cable industry becomes sufficiently competitive?160 Why was
it not enough for Congress to simply pass structural regulations aimed at
increasing competition? By adding the must-carry and other regulations aimed
at the internal policies of cable systems, Congress seems to have exceeded the
boundaries of its own mandate.
Despite these contrary arguments, the Court in Turner accepted Congress'
factual assertions about the nature of the cable industry, levels of competition,
and the ability and desire of cable systems to frustrate the success of local
broadcast programmers (although it did remand the case to determine whether
the must-carry rules actually remedy these supposed evils).161 In doing so,
the Court implicitly adopted a bottleneck/monopoly model in which the
substantiality of the government's interest in regulation will now be presumed
and the only remaining question will be whether a given regulation actually
serves whatever interest the government asserts.

B. Summary and Significance of the Court's Choice ofModels
The significance of the Supreme Court's adoption of the
bottleneck/monopoly model for scrutinizing the constitutionality of cable
regulations should not be underestimated. By advancing this framework, the
Court has given the government substantial discretion to regulate this industry
and possibly other emerging communications industries as well. Most
regulations that substantially affect speech or that target the press for special
treatment are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.162 And in such cases,
the government bears the burden of establishing their constitutionality. But

by adopting this bottleneck/monopoly model for cable, the Court has
effectively shifted this burden. From now on, regulations aimed at the cable
industry may be given the same type of deference that courts typically give
to broadcast regulations. 163 Technically, the government will still bear the

159. S. REP. No. 92, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1991).
160. To its credit, Congress exempts from regulation any cable system that is
subject to effective competition, as defmed in § 3 of the '92 Act. This exemption,
however, only applies to regulation of cable rates. It does not exempt a system from
the must-carry provisions or any other provision in the act.
161. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2471-72.
162. ld. at 2458.
163. Note that the applicable standards are actually not the same. In the broadcast
context, the government need only demonstrate something akin to a "rational basis" for
the regulation. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In the
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burden of establishing the constitutionality of any regulations that restrict the
speech of cable system operators, but the reality is that new regulations will
come to the courts bearing a Turner stamp of approval that cable plaintiffs
will be forced to overcome. In other words, the substantiality of the
government's interest in regulation has now been established. And with the
onus effectively on the cable industry rather than government, further
regulations may simply go unchallenged.
Moreover, the 0 'Brien
standard-which is interpreted to be a tougher standard than the "rational
basis" scrutiny applied in other contexts l64-has proven to be a flimsy
barrier to regulation. In fact, some have argued that, as applied, 0 'Brien
provides little more than rational basis protection. 165
Another particularly daunting. consequence of Turner is that it could be
used to guide the government's approach to all new communications
technologies and delivery systems. In Turner, the Court relied on two
principles: (1) that cable systems operate as de facto monopolies, and (2) that
cable systems can and do work as bottlenecks because they are an "essential
facility" that all programming must pass through.166 It is possible that these
rationales for government regulation of the cable industry could be applied to
other communications industries that share these characteristics. Any new

cable context, the government will have to show a substantial interest. See
O'BrienIWard test, supra notes 36-39. Nevertheless, having already applied the
substantial interest test to the very intrusive must-carry rules, and having effectively
sustained their constitutionality, the Court has essentially sustained the constitutionality
of other, slightly less intrusive, regulations. And it has also affmned the government's
substantial interest in regulation, so that in most cases, the only question will be
whether the regulation is more restrictive than necessary. This is analogous to the
situation in the broadcast industry where even though the government is supposed to
bear the burden of showing a rational basis for its regulations, the reality is that most
regulation of broadcasting bears a presumption of constitutionality.
164. Rational basis scrutiny applies to most economic regulations. Under tIlls test,
a regulation will be found constitutional provided there is a rational relationship
between the regulation and the harm sought to be remedied. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. ct.

2637,2642 (1993). The burden of proof under rational basis scrutiny is on the party
challenging the government action. ld. at 2643. Economic regulations are subject to
heightened scrutiny if tItey impose differential treatment to similar media, Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Rageland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987), if they target particular
ideas or content, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd. 502
U.S. 105, 115 (1991), orif the restriction of speech is substantial enough to trigger the
internlediate scrutiny of 0 'BrienIWard. See supra notes 36-39.
165. See Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1991); and Keith Werhan, The 0 'Briening of Free Speech
Methodology, 19 ARIz. ST. L.J. 635 (1987).
166. Turner, 114 S. Ct at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion refers to the same concept but does not use the same language.

1995]

CABLE TELEVISION

827

communications system that serves as a conduit for the speech of people other
than the owner or the owner's agents could be susceptible to regulation. Also,
any communications system that operates without direct competition from an
identical system could also be vulnerable. The justifications for regulation
relied upon by the Court in Turner could be cited by Congress, the FCC, and
the courts to sanction a substantial government role in the development of the
nation's communications infrastructure. In fact, applying the rationales
proffered by the Court in Turner, the newspaper industry could even be at
risk. If there is market dysfunction in the newspaper industry, as some
believe,167 there may be little standing in the way of more exacting
regulation of the traditional press.

III. TuRNER. AND FIRsT AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
The Turner Court's choice of regulatory models was significant and could
have a lasting impact, not only on the cable industry but on the entire system
of communications that is emerging. But aside from its general assessment
of the constitutional status of cable television, an equally important and
troubling aspect of the Court's decision was its interpretation and application
of First Amendment principles.

A. Turner and the Permissible Scope of Content Regulation
One of the primary arguments made by the cable plaintiffs in Turner was
that the must-carry rules are content-based regulations that should be strictly
It is a fundamental First Amendment principle that
scrutinized. 168
government restrictions of expression that are aimed at the content of that
expression are subject to the most exacting level of judicial scrutiny.169
Such regulations will only be upheld where they are narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling government interest. l7O As a practical matter, such laws are
rarely upheld upon review by a court.l7l

167. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 139; and Jerome Barron, Access to the Press-A
New First AmendmentRight, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641, 1647-1648 (1967).
168. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
169. Boosv. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
170. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) ("above all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content").
171. There are exceptions, but usually only where some other fundamental right
is involved. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding a law that
prohibited the solicitation of votes and the dissemination of campaign materials within
100 feet of a polling place).
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Content-based laws come in one of two forms. They can either be
viewpoint-basedl72 or subject-matter-based. 173 Some have argued that only
viewpoint-based laws should be subject to strict scrutiny,174 while at the
other extreme, some contend that the distinction between content-based and
content-neutral laws should be eliminated altogether. 17S The current
approach of the Court, however, provides that both types of content-based
regulations (viewpoint and subject matter) are subject to strict scrutiny.176
Regulations can be classified as content-based in one of two ways, according
to Professor Laurence Tribe: (1) if, on their face, they target particular ideas
or information, or (2) they are neutral on their face, but are adopted for a
content-based purpose. 177
The Court in Turner held that the must-carry provisions of the '92 Act
are content-neutral, both on their face and as to purpose, and should not be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny. They are content-neutral on their face, the
Court held, because the distinctions they make between speakers are based
solely on the means by which they transmit messages, not on the content of
those messages. 178 Furthermore, they are neutral as to purpose because they
were not adopted in order to advance speech of a favored content. Instead,
Congress' primary purpose in passing the rules was to ensure the economic
survival of broadcasters. 179
These conclusions are flawed in several respects. First, the must-carry
rules benefit broadcasters at the expense of cable systems, which, as Judge
Williams of the district court wrote in dissent, "automatically entails content
requirements."180 The must-carry provisions are direct, government-imposed
restrictions of the right of cable system operators to control the tenor of their

172. E.g., Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102
(1972) (law prohibited picketing in certain areas, but exempted labor picketing).
173. E.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims, 502 U.S. 105,
116 (1991) (law requiring the seizure of profits of certain categories of books-those
written by those seeking to profit from their crimes).
174. See generally JEROME A. BARRON AND C. THOMAS DIENES, FiRsT
AMENDMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 34-35 (West PUblishing 1993).
175. Martin Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34

STAN. L. REv. 113, 142-151 (1981).
176. See Boosv. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 & 334 (1988), Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. New York Crime Victims, 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991), and Burson v. Freeman, 504
U.S. 191, 197 (1992), where laws at issue in all three cases were struck down as
content-based, even though they were not based on viewpoint.
177. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 794 (Foundation
Press, 2d.ed. 1988).
178. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2460.
179. Id at 246l.
180. Turner, 819 F. Supp. 32, 58 (D.D.C. 1993).
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own e}..llression. These provisions force cable systems to carry - and thus
promote - the messages of others, and at the same time, by appropriating
much of their channel capacity, they limit the means by which cable system
operators can communicate their own messages. Such restrictions cannot
fairly be labeled content-neutra1. As the Court pointed out in Buckley v.
Valeo, lithe concept that the government can restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment." ISI
Furthermore, even if these distinctions between different media are not
facially content-based, the allocation of benefits and burdens evinces a clear
intent by Congress to promote the speech of broadcasters over that of cable
system operators. Indeed, Congress argues in the Act itself that broadcast
television is "an important source of local news, public affairs programming
and other local broadcast services critical to an informed electorate. 11182

Would Congress have passed the must-carry rules had it not determined that
there was something wrong with the content of cable television programming,
or at least that something could be gained in the overall quality of television
programming by edifying one source at the expense of another?
Congress argues, and the majority in Turner agrees, that the must-carry
rules are not content-based but are merely designed to ensure the survival of
the broadcast industry.l83 But why? Because of the content of the messages
provided by local broadcast stations. The value that Congress ascribes to local
broadcast stations must be based on content because content is the only thing
by which one can assess the value of those stations. As Justice O'Connor
wrote in dissent: liThe interests of ensuring access to a multiplicity of diverse
and antagonistic sources of information, no matter how praiseworthy, is
directly tied to the content of what the speakers will likely say."IS4 "While
there may be nothing wrong with a" law that promotes the interests of local
broadcast stations, when it does so for a content-based reason and at the
e}..llense of another communications medium, then a clear First Amendment
boundary has been breached.
The Court's application of the content-basedlcontent-neutralframework
is one of the most significant aspects of its analysis in Turner. Although the
Court missed an opportunity to establish some definitive boundaries to this
paradigm, Turner is an important case in its evolution. There has been a split
developing on the Court for a few years over the defmition of "content-based."
On one side are those who defme content-based broadly to include not only

181. 424 U.S. 1,48-49 (1976).
182. Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
§ 2(a)(11), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460-1463.
183. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2461.
184. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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viewpoint-based regulations, but also subject-matter and speaker-based
regulations. ISS In Turner, four justices, O'Connor, Ginsburg, Thomas and
Scalia, believed that the must-carry rules, even though not viewpoint-based,
were substantial enough intrusions on the editorial functions of cable system
operators to warrant strict scrutiny. They argued in dissent that by making
reference to the benefits of broadcast programming, Congress clearly had
taken content into account. I86 The majority in Turner, however, determined
that the must-carry regulations were not content-based. Justices Kennedy,
Rehnquist, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter held that these regulations were
content-neutral, despite the fact that they interfered to some extent with cable
operators' editorial discretion. I87
In Turner, the majority seems to have contracted the Court's defmition
of what is "content-based." It now appears that in order to get strict scrutiny,
it is not enough that certain subjects, topics, or speakers are singled out by the
government; instead, the Court seems to suggest that plaintiffs must show
evidence of a preference for particular ideas or viewpoints. Several recent
Supreme Court decisions suggest a similar condensation of this paradigm. 18s
Turner seems to have helped solidify that pattern, although only five justices
endorsed it. Before these changes began to occur, the Court's First
Amendment analysis was beginning to resemble its approach to Title VII
employment discrimination claims. Under Title VII, plaintiffs can sue under
either a "disparate treatment" theoryI89 or a "disparate impact theory."190
In disparate treatment cases, plaintiffs can succeed by showing that a particular
employment decision was motivated by hostility or animus toward a particular
individual or groUp.I9I This is similar to the treatment given to viewpoint-

185. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of st. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), and Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991). In both
cases, there were substantial divisions among the justices regarding what is contentbased and what is not, and also in what types of situations this paradigm should be
applied.
186. ld.
187. ld. at 2460.
188. See RA.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); and Leathers v. Medlock, 499
U.S. 439 (1991).
189. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
190. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
191. Under the test set out in McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff can establish a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing that they: (1) are a member of a racial
minority, (2) that they applied for a position that was open and for which they were
qualified, (3) they were not hired, and (4) after they were rejected, the employer
continued to seek applicants. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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based regulations of speech. l92 Title VII plaintiffs can also succeed by
showing that an employment criterion or decision has a disparate impact on
protected groups, regardless of the employer's motivation. l93 Previous
Supreme Court decisions took a similar approach in First Amendment cases;
specifically, statutes that singled out particular organizations or mediums for
special treatment or to bear special burdens, i.e., "speaker-based" regulations,
were subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of the underlying motive. 194 After
Turner, it is no longer certain that regulations targeting particular media or
organizations will be found unconstitutional. Plaintiffs demonstrating
something like a disparate impact may not succeed after Turner unless they
are able to demonstrate some particularized evidence of a bias or animuS. 19S

B. Turner and the Compelled Speech Doctrine
Another argument made by the plaintiffs in Turner was that the mustcarryrules compel speech by cable system operators, which violates their First
Amendment rights. It is settled First Amendment law that a person's right to
free expression is violated where they are compelled to speak as a result of

192. Specifically, in both situations, the focus of the court is on the intent of the
defendant. Regulations targeting particular ideas or viewpoints, or employment
practices targeting particular employees because of their race, gender, national origin,
etc., are both almost always impennissible.
193. Under the standard set out in Wards Cove, a Title VII plaintiff will not
succeed unless they can demonstrate that they have suffered some actual harm and that
it was the result of specific employment practices. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656. In
both disparate impact cases under Title VII and First Amendment challenges to
content-neutral regulations, it does not matter that the defendant had an innocent
motive; the focus is on the harm caused.
194. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983); and See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
195. In Turner, the Court argued that the cases prohibiting "speaker-based"
regulations, see supra note 29, only prohibit regulations that "carry the inherent risk
of undermining First Amendment interests." Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2468. As a result,
this line of cases involving "speaker-based" regulations appears to have been limited
by the Court in Tumerto only prohibit regulations that target speakers for the stated
or implied purpose of restricting expression of certain ideas, viewpoints or subjects.
It appears that motive will now be an important element in these cases, which means
there is no longer any First Amendment parallel to "disparate impact" claims under
Title VII. The clear command of the Court is that singling out particular media or
organizations for special treatment or to bear special burdens will no longer be
considered inherently inconsistent with the First Amendment. Instead, it only begins
the analysis. In short, disparate treatment, i.e., discrimination regarding ideas, subjects
or viewpoints, will have be demonstrated; disparate impact will not be enough.
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direct or indirect government pressure. 196 In Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education, for example; the Supreme Court invalidated a state rule that
permitted unions of state employees to collect dues, portions of which were
to be used for political purposes. l97 Similarly, in Wooley v. Maynard, the
Court held that the State of New Hampshire could not punish citizens who
covered up the state motto "live free or die" on their license plate where that
motto conflicted with their religious beliefs. 198 The Court wrote that "[t]he
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind. ,,,199
The clear weight of the Court's precedents, then, suggests that not only does
the First Amendment protect citizens from being prevented from speaking, it
also shields them in most circumstances from being forced to speak.200
The Court's rejection of the plaintiff's arguments on this point is
disingenuous at best. The Court cites the Tornill0 201 and Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. Public Utility Commission202 decisions as the two most
relevant compelled speech cases, but it argues that neither is controlling, for
two reasons: First, the must-carry rules are content-neutral in application
because they "are not activated by any particular message spoken by cable
operators and thus exact no content-based penalty."203 The Court fails to

reveal, however, that the same was true in Pacific Gas. In Pacific Gas, the
compelled speech was not triggered by any particular message. Instead, just
like under the must-carry rules, it was triggered by the government's grant of
access to an organization unaffiliated with the plaintiff organization.

196. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(prohibiting mandatory saluting of the flag).
197. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
198. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
199. Id. at 714.
200. There are exceptions to this rule, such as mandatory reporting of income
taxes, etc., but these requirements are usually tied to some other content-neutral and
generally applicable state or federal law. See David W. Ogden, Is There A First
Amendment 'Right to Remain Silent'?: The Supreme Court's 'Compelled Speech
Doctrine, , 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 368 (1993).
201. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See supra
teA'! accompanying notes 128-133 for more discussion.
202. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986)
(plurality opinion). This case struck down a rule that required a privately owned
utility company to include an editorial newsletter with its billing statements that was
critical of the company. The Court held that the utility company would reasonably
feel compelled to speak in order to protect its reputation. Therefore, the speech was
effoctively compelled.
203. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2465.
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Second, the Court argues that the must-carry rules will not force cable
operators to alter their own messages in order to respond to or counter-balance
the broadcast programming they are required to carry.204 It is presumptuous,
however, to assume that no cable system operator will ever reasonably feel
compelled to respond to the messages it is forced to carry under the mustcarry rules. In fact, many local broadcast stations are being purchased by
religious organizations throughout the country, many of whom are doing so
in hopes of taking advantage of the must-carry rules and being assured
substantial access to cable systems. What recourse does a cable system
operator have who is opposed to this kind of programming because it conflicts
with her own religious.beliefs? Is this not compelling some kind of response
from that person in precisely the same way that the plaintiff in Pacific Gas
was compelled to respond?
The crux of the compelled speech doctrine would seem to be that the
government cannot force people to advance a particular idea any more than
it can prevent them from advancing an idea. Similarly, the government
cannot force people to share affiliations with others any more than the
government can prevent people from affiliating with others. But this is
precisely what the must-carry rules do. At least potentially, they force cable
system operators to share an affiliation with broadcasters with whose messages

they may disagree. More fundamentally, the must-carry rules interfere with
the editorial functions of cable system operators in a way that is not tolerated
with other media. At the same time the Court acknowledges that cable system
operators exercise editorial functions and that they are protected by the First
Amendment, it permits direct government encroachment on those functions.
And when a media organization of any kind is forced to support the
transmission of messages with which it disagrees, its autonomy is lost, as is
its ability to function independently in the marketplace of ideas.

IV. PuTrING TuRNER. IN ITS PLACE: AN ANALYSIS OF TIlE CASE ON
REMAND AND A LOOK AT DANIELS CABLEVISION

Having outlined some of the most salient consequences of the Court's
decision in Turner, it is important to look at how some of the principles
adopted by the Court might be applied in the future and also how the
disposition of the Turner case itself might be altered when the district court
panel hears the case on remand.

204. ld.
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A. Turner on Remand: The Case for the Plaintiffs
Despite. the largely negative consequences of the Turner decision for
members of the cable industry, the cable plaintiffs did win a couple of small
victories. First, the Court held that the low level scrutiny applied to broadcast
regulations is inapplicable to cable in most circumstances. 20S Although this
holding by the Court was not surprising, it was nevertheless a success for the
cable plaintiffs. Another victory for the plaintiffs was that the Court
remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether the mustcarry requirements are necessary to prevent the demise of local
broadcasting.206 Given the district court panel's earlier decision in this case
and the tenor of the Supreme Court's opinion, it may at first seem unlikely
that the plaintiffs will succeed on remand. But there is actually a substantial
amount of support for their side.
The plaintiffs might be able to demonstrate that local broadcasters are not
in fact in economic peril and in need of assistance. There are thousands of
local commercial broadcasters in this country,207 and just as an intuitive
matter it seems likely that if the broadcast industry was spiraling toward
extinction, there would be fewer of them around. 20s Still, resolution of this
question will require an examination of the record compiled by Congress,
among other sources. It will also depend on how the district court approaches
this factual question and how much deference it is willing to give to
Congressional findings.
Nevertheless, even if the district court agrees with Congress that
broadcast television's survival is threatened by uncooperative cable systems,
the cable plaintiffs might be able to show that the must-carry rules do not
actually advance the government's asserted interests. One of the primary
interests of the government in passing the must-carry laws was to ensure that
viewers had access to local programming.209 It is not at all clear, however,
that the must-carry rules advance that interest. On most cable systems,
mainstream local broadcast signals are already carried.210 So, the primary
beneficiaries of the must-carry rules are the less popular and more obscure
broadcasters-home shopping channels, religious broadcasters, and the like.

205. ld. at 2456.
206. ld. at 2472.
207. At the end of 1994, there were more than 1,500 television stations according
to U.S. BROADCASTING AND CABLE YEARBOOK. See YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at xi.
208. YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at xi.
209. 47 U.S.C. § 521 (a)(8)(A)-(D) (Supp. V 1993).
210. Congress seems to acknowledge this in the "purposes" section of the '92 Act.
See 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(17) and (19) (Supp. V 1993).
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Not only do the must-carry rules fail to benefit many of the local
broadcast stations, in many cases the broadcasters that gain access as a result
of the must-carry rules do so at the expense of a cable programmer. C-Span,
for example, has been taken off many cable systems to make room for "must

carry" broadcasters.21l So, in the name of public service, the government
is often guaranteeing access for home shopping channels while bumping other
cable channels whose content may be in much higher demand. And even
where a cable channel does not get bumped as a result of the must-carry
requirements, many get moved on the system. In Washington, D.C., for
example, a city whose population is seventy percent African-American, one
local cable system was forced to move the Black Entertainment Television
(BET) channel from channel 6 to channel35 on its system-all to make room
for an obscure local broadcaster.212
Another argument that could be successful on remand is that while levels
of competition in the cable industry were low when Congress was conducting
its investigations on this issue, the industry has grown substantially more
competitive in the past couple of years. First, Congress itself took steps in the
'92 Act to foster competition, eliminating the granting of exclusive
franchises,213 for example. Second, two important new players have entered
the video services marketplace-telephone companies (te1cos) and direct
broadcast satellite system operators. DBS systems are currently competing
directly with local cable systems in a number of cities and telcos are providing
video dialtone service. In addition, the major telecommunications bill
currently being debated in Congress contains provisions that would allow
telcos to provide video services on a non-common-carrier basis and to
compete directly with existing cable systems.214 Again, to the extent that an

211. See Paul Farhi, Dimming Cable's Eye on Congress: Fewer People Are
Getting C-Span Because ofNew Law's Breakfor Broadcasters, WASHINGTON POST,

September 7, 1993, at E1.
212. Comments by BET's Vice President for Legal Affairs Maurita K. Coley at
the 1994 Communications Law Conference of the Practicing Law Instit;ute, New York
City, Nov. 10-11.
213. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting franchising
authorities from granting exclusive franchises or from unreasonably refusing to grant
an additional competitive franchise).
214. Both the House bill (H.R. 1555) and the Senate bill (S. 652) include
provisions that would eliminate the cable/telco cross-ownership ban, see 47 U.S.C.
§ 553(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and allow telcos to provide video services.
Furthermore, even if a telecommunications bill is not passed, the cross-ownership ban
may be struck down as a violation of the telcos' First Amendment rights. Several
federal courts have already reached that conclusion. Chesapeake & Potomac
Telephone Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. granted 115 S. Ct.
2608 (1995); U.S. West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th cir. 1994); Ameritech
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absence of competition is the rationale for regulation, these developments
would seem to undermine the government's asserted interests.
Also, even if the must-carry rules do advance the government's asserted
. interests in some cities, the district court might be willing to limit their
application to those cities where there is no competition. The plaintiffs might
ask why other provisions in the Act-namely, the provisions regarding rate
regulation-are triggered only by the absence of competition while the mustcarry rules apply to cable systems in every market, regardless of how
competitive it is.
Finally, if the district court does eventually rule that the must-carry rules
are unconstitutional because they fail the second and third prongs of the
o 'BrienIWard tesf15, then it is essential that the court specify what aspects
of the Supreme Court's Turner decision survive as precedent. Because the
Supreme Court's opinion is so dependent on the factual presumption that cable
systems are bottlenecks to diverse programming and that they threaten the
survival of broadcasters,216 to the extent that this notion is disproved on
remand, the entire Supreme Court decision is undermined. If the district court
or other courts do not recognize this and put Turner in its proper place, it
could take on a life of its own. To all communicators affected by this
decision, that is something that should be vigilantly guarded against.

B. Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States217
The Daniels case, currently before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, involves a First Amendment challenge to several
provisions of the '92 Act. The most important of these, and the most
constitutionally suspect (at least prior to Turner) are the provisions requiring
cable system operators to carry public, educational, and governmental (pEG)
programming/IS and the provisions requiring them to provide leased access

Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. ill 1994). The U.S. Supreme Court
has agreed to hear Chesapeake, so a fmal determination of the constitutionality of the
cross-ownership ban will not come until later in 1996. Of course, the case would
become moot with the passage of the telecommunications hill.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
216. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2454 & 2468.
217. 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993) [hereinafter "Daniels"].
218. Under the '84 Act, local franchising authorities are permitted to require cable
systems to set aside channels for public, educational and governmental (pEG) use. 47
U.S.C. § 531(c) (1988). Under the '92 Act, 47 U.S.C. § 535 (Supp. V 1993), cable
systems are required to carry all qualified noncommercial educational channels that
request access, regardless of the desires of either the cable system operator or the
franchising authority. The total number of noncommercial educational channels that
must be given access depends on the channel capacity of the system. Also, the cable
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to programmers not affiliated with the system operator.219 The district court
upheld the constitutionality of both of these provisions.220 An extensive
analysis of Daniels is not necessary here, but it is important to briefly discuss
two of its possible consequences.
First, while it is likely that, in light of Turner, the Daniels court will
uphold the constitutionality of the leased access provisions, the same is not
true with the PEG requirements. The appellate court needs to recognize that
even if the must-carry rules could be classified as content-neutral, the PEG
requirements go one step further. The PEG requirements are content-based
on their face because they force cable system operators to carry certain types
of programming-programs dealing with public, governmental or educational
issues. The focus is clearly on the subject matter of the speech and not
merely the means of its transmission. In addition, the PEG requirements are
unconstitutional as applied because they were clearly passed to remedy some
perceived deficiency in the content of programming on existing cable systems.
If members of Congress had not determined that something was wrong with
existing cable programming, the PEG requirements would not have been
necessary. Recognizing this-and distinguishing the PEG rules from the
must-carry rules-would be an important development, if for no other reason
than because it would establish some clear limit to the scope of government
intrusion into the editorial functions of cable system operators.
Second, the Daniels case is important more generally because all of the
premises relied upon by the Supreme Court in Turner will be put to the test
once again. It is possible that, unlike the Supreme Court in Turner, the
Daniels court will recognize the dramatic changes taking place in the structure
of the communications industry. The court could properly apply the Turner
precedent while at the same time reaching different results, provided it opens
its eyes to the changing levels of competition in the industry and how the
regulatory rationales relied upon by Congress and the Supreme Court are
already outdated. It is even possible that things will have changed so
dramatically by the time the Daniels case is decided that the Supreme Court

system operator is prohibited from interfering with the content of the PEG
programming once those channels have been allocated. 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) (1988).
219. Under the 1984 Act, cable system operators are required to set aside a
certain number of channels for commercial use (leased access) by people unaffIliated
with the cable system operator. 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1) (1988). The'92 Act does not
change this requirement, but it does add two key provisions. The fIrst allows cable
systems to prohibit the use of their leased access channels for programming that
contains "obscene material, sexually explicit conduct, or material soliciting or
promoting unlawful conduct." 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The other
gives the F.C.C. the authority to detennine "maximum reasonable rates" that a cable
operator may charge for use of its leased access channels. ld.
220. Daniels, 835 F. Supp. at 6-7.
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will review it. Whateverthe decision, those concerned about the future of the
cable industry will be anxiously awaiting the D.C. Circuit's resolution of

Daniels.
CONCLUSION

When confronted with a new technology or a nascent industry, the
government almost instinctively latches on with all its regulatory might. The
presumption of Congress, the FCC, and some local governments seems to be

that an unregulated industry is a dangerous industry. This is especially the
case with communications technologies. Today, after three decades of
regulation, the cable industry has never been more squarely under the thumb
of government. Unfortunately, with the Court's decision in Turner,
government encroachments on the rights of cable system operators and
programmers will continue to expand. Especially in this period of dramatic
infrastructural transformation, Congress and the FCC will fmd it hard to resist
the temptation to intervene. In the post-Turner, post-Cable Act world, there
is little standing in their way-certainly not the First Amendment.
The long-term consequences of the Turner decision are difficult to
predict. It could be that the decision will be modified on remand, or the case
could be altered by the resolution of the Daniels case. More likely, however,
the Turner decision will substantially dampen the cable industry's hopes of
acquiring the same level of autonomy as the print media. Instead, cable
operators will have to do their best in a world in which the government is in
substantial control of their fortunes.
On the macro-level, the Court in Turner has created a broad presumption
in favor of the constitutionality of regulation. New regulations will come to
the Court with a presumption that they serve a "substantial government
interest, II and that they are somehow justified by the special economic
circumstances of the cable television marketplace. On the micro-level, the
Court has made clear that many of the most important barriers to government
encroachments on First Amendment rights will be of marginal consequence.
In doing so, it may have altered those principles in a way that could invite
greater restrictions on all speech regardless of the vehicle through which it is
expressed.

